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 For the past several years the issue of homosexual marriage has been at the 
forefront of an often intense debate in American political culture.  Those who oppose the 
policy have, by and large, been in the majority.  But in America, majority decisions are 
not automatically legal; such status is obtained only when policies are not in conflict with 
the Constitution.  With that in mind, this paper aims to show how not allowing 
homosexual marriage can amount to an unconstitutional endorsement of religion.   To 
accomplish this I will first examine the main arguments presented against the policy by 
the defenders of traditional marriage and show how they fail.  With the main arguments 
undercut, opponents of gay marriage must have either no real basis for their position, or 
make their arguments from within specific comprehensive (generally religious) doctrines- 
a phenomenon widespread enough to possibly constitute a violation of the first 
amendment. 
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I.  Introduction 
 
 For the past several years the issue of homosexual marriage has been at the 
forefront of an often intense debate in American political culture.  What was only a few 
generations ago considered completely unthinkable- men and women openly engaging in 
homosexual relationships- has become, if not accepted, at least tolerable.  Since the 2003 
decision of the Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas, it has even been legal for them to 
do so.  With their private relationships finally considered to be something the government 
cannot legitimately prohibit, it would seem that the next logical step would be to gain 
legal recognition as well, in the form of marriage. 
 But what might seem like a relatively small step to some (after all, it is legal for 
homosexuals to participate in promise ceremonies all but identical to marriage in its 
non-legal aspects, only lacking many of the legal property rights and responsibilities 
official state recognition entails) is a huge and utterly misguided, wrong, and dangerous 
policy change for others.  These people, who by most accounts constitute a majority of 
the American public1, vigorously and fiercely fight any attempt to revise the legal 
category of marriage to include homosexual relationships. 
 Unfortunately for the opponents of gay marriage, majority decisions are not 
automatically legal in the United States.  Although legislation is not enacted without 
majority approval (of elected representatives, anyway), it is equally important that such 
                                                
1 61% of the population, plus or minus 3%, according to a 2003 CBS News/New York Times poll:  
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2003/12/19/opinion/polls/main589551.shtml 
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decisions do not conflict with the principles of the Constitution.  Activists, with 
numerous arguments, have claimed that the prohibition on homosexual marriage does 
precisely that.  In response, rather than merely pointing at the ballot box to prove their 
case, opponents of gay marriage have had to articulate a range of arguments to support 
the continuation of the current status quo.  The success of the arguments (on both sides) 
is debatable; what is undeniable is that constitutional principles will almost certainly be at 
or near the heart of any serious attempt to change the institution of marriage. 
 In this paper, I too aim to show that not allowing homosexual marriage can be 
shown to be unconstitutional.  However, I intend to take a distinctive approach.  While 
most arguments to date have relied on equal protection considerations, I believe that 
prohibition on gay unions can be shown to be an unconstitutional government 
endorsement of religion, in violation of the first amendment.  I will admit up front that I 
do not believe I can show that this is necessarily the case in modern America.  But I do 
think that I can show a high probability, or a reasonable certainty, that such a violation is 
in fact what is going on in contemporary political culture.  To reach this conclusion I 
must engage in something of a roundabout argument; with this in mind, I must first spend 
a few moments to explain the structure of the argument as it will follow in this paper. 
 
II. Structure of the Argument 
 
 Proving that not allowing homosexual marriage amounts to an unconstitutional 
endorsement of religion is no simple task.  Opponents of homosexual marriage can point 
to a wide range of arguments, none obviously religious in nature, as proof that their 
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position is perfectly within the domain of legitimate American law and, if anything, that 
it is the supporters of gay marriage who hold the more uncertain ground in the debate.  It 
would make no difference then if some defenders of traditional marriage might be against 
homosexuality and homosexual marriage for religious reasons, because they can still 
point to valid non-religious motivations to justify their position. 
 It is these additional arguments that complicate the task and force me to attack the 
problem in something of a roundabout way.  Rather than directly showing that 
prohibiting homosexual marriage is an unconstitutional endorsement of religion, I must 
take a lead from the Lemon test and first show that all the other arguments against it fail.  
The Lemon test, a three-pronged test to determine whether legislation violates the 
Establishment Clause, has as one of its prongs that the governments action must have a 
valid secular purpose.  Once I have shown that the secular arguments do not work and the 
opponents of gay marriage have had their legs cut out from under them (so to speak), the 
possibility of showing that a constitutional violation has occurred opens up.  I will argue 
for this possibility more fully in the final section of the thesis. 
 In this paper, I will first examine and give reasons for rejecting four distinct 
arguments against gay marriage:  the marital good argument, the moral tradition 
argument, an argument from definition, and the slippery slope argument.  I treat the 
marital good argument, described primarily in John Finnis and other new natural 
lawyers work, before the rest because I believe it to be the most serious argument being 
put forth in current scholarly literature, and because I think the other three arguments 
(perhaps unknowingly) rely on it in some way.  Second is the argument from moral 
tradition, epitomized in Justice Scalias dissent in Lawrence v. Texas, which, although 
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not quite as important in scholarly literature, encapsulates well many opponents view on 
the subject.  The argument from definition, although the weakest and most easily treated 
of the four, needs to be treated because of the frequency with which it arises in debates on 
gay marriage; I will take the opportunity in this section to also talk about domestic 
partnerships and why they are not the optimal solution.  I will treat the slippery slope 
argument- perhaps the most common reason given in opposition to gay marriage- last 
because a rejection of this argument, similar to my argument for unconstitutionality, 
requires that all other reasons be rejected first.  I take these lines of thought to be 
representative of the best reasons offered by those opposed to the policy.  Although other 
reasons could be given, most are either blatantly and purely religious or slight deviations 
from one of the four lines of thought listed above. 
 Once the four arguments against homosexual marriage have been shown to fail, it 
is possible to show that preventing the policy can amount to an unconstitutional 
government endorsement of religion.  But this is by no means a foregone conclusion.  
Although I do not think it is possible to show that rejecting gay marriage is necessarily 
unduly religious in nature, I do think an excellent case can be made to suggest that that is 
exactly what is happening in contemporary American society.  The last section will 
attempt to do exactly that, by taking the Lemon test, applying it to the situation after the 
four primary arguments are rejected and exploring what conclusions we can draw from it. 
 That, then, is the structure of the argument of the paper in a nutshell:  a kind of via 
negativa in which we learn what is by first exploring what is not.  With that in mind, it is 
now time to turn to the first line of debate: the new natural lawyers and their marital 
good. 
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III. The Marital Good Defense 
 
 The marital good defense is a formulation of John Finnis and several other new 
natural lawyers such as Patrick Lee, Robert George, Gerard Bradley, and so on.  Finnis is 
the most well known of the group, and since his claims and formulations are more or less 
identical with the others, I will be dealing specifically with his work in this section.  The 
section itself will proceed in two parts.  The first and shorter section will attempt to lay 
out the argument in a concise and clear manner.  In the second, I will go into the 
numerous problems with and arguments against the marital good argument. 
 
The Argument 
 
 One of the central assertions of Finnis and the new natural lawyers is that there 
are certain natural basic goods, and that these basic goods are worth pursuing for intrinsic 
reasons.  One of these basic goods they call the marital good, and from this basic marital 
good they derive an argument against not just homosexual marriage, but homosexuality 
in general.  I believe the basic structure of their argument from the marital good to the 
conclusion that homosexuality is immoral can be laid out in six steps as follows: 
 
1. There exists a marital good that is discernible in heterosexual marriage. 
2. This marital good is a good because it is the simultaneous realization of the 
twofold goods of procreation (and the long term responsibility and mutual 
support that proper child rearing entails) and friendship. 
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3. The marital good is realized principally in the marital act, genital sexual 
intercourse between spouses, that enables them to actualize and experience 
their marriage itself, as a single reality with two blessings.2 
4. Sex acts that do not realize the marital good can achieve no more than 
individual gratification, which is unhealthy for the individual, damaging to 
society, and therefore immoral. 
5. Because homosexual sex cannot realize the twin goals of friendship and 
procreation, it cannot be marital. 
6. Because it cannot be marital, homosexual sex (actually, anything other than 
noncontracepted vaginal intercourse between spouses) must be immoral. 
 
 I think that list encapsulates the argument as concisely as possible.  The idea 
seems to be that the purpose of marriage is twofold: both friendship and responsibility 
and mutual support through childrearing.  This purpose is realized principally in marital 
sexual acts, in which spouses come together in the spirit of love, friendship, and 
companionship, and are also open to the possibility of children and the responsibilities 
that would entail.  This marital act is the ideal sexual act; any non-marital intercourse can 
realize at best only one of the two goals.  Non-marital intercourse could be merely for 
procreation, in which case the mutual love and friendship are lacking and sex becomes a 
merely mechanical thing; it could be for emotional togetherness and friendship, in which 
case the willingness for long-term commitment (shown through an openness to 
procreation) seems to be lacking; or it could be merely for personal gratification, in 
                                                
2 Finnis, John.  Law, Morality, and Sexual Orientation.  In Same Sex: Debating the Ethics, Science, and 
Culture of Homosexuality, John Corvino, ed.  p. 34. 
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which case the humans involved are acting as little more than animals.  This argument 
seems to draw some of its plausibility from most peoples intuitive sense that sex can or 
should be something important and uplifting between two people, and that not every sex 
act is a good one.  But what would strike many people as an initial plausibility does not 
mean that the argument ultimately holds up, which brings us neatly to the second section 
and some criticisms of this theory. 
 
The Response 
 
 There are many points where a critic might immediately criticize the martial good 
argument.  You could reject the idea that procreation is an intrinsic good; you could point 
out that the marital good doesnt seem to have anything to do with legal marriage; you 
could suggest that the marital good might be realized in other ways than intercourse, such 
as, perhaps, taking care of a sick partner, which would seem to realize both 
friendship/companionship (talking with the spouse while ill) and mutual support and 
responsibility (caregiving for an ill partner, with the knowledge that he or she would do 
the same were the positions reversed); and you could reject the idea that any sex act that 
is not marital must be merely for personal gratification.  But it is always best to show that 
an argument fails on its own grounds, and I will try to show that first, in the sterile 
partners objection.  I will then proceed briefly to what I think are two other weighty 
objections, the false dilemma objection and the public/private objection. 
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 The sterile partners problem is the first, and most obvious, objection to the marital 
good argument, and most critics do not fail to mention it.3  The problem, in a nutshell, is 
this.  In order to exclude homosexuals from marriage, Finnis needs to find something in 
that relationship that heterosexual unions intrinsically lack.  The most obvious and 
immediate difference to come to mind is that homosexuals cannot, unaided, have 
children.  If marriage is, at least in part, about procreation (and not merely children, 
because homosexuals could adopt), then homosexuals shouldnt be allowed to be 
married.4  But heres the rub: not all heterosexual couples can have children.  It would 
seem that, if procreation is really intrinsic to true marriage, then sterile heterosexual 
partners shouldnt be allowed to get married either.  Postmenopausal women are 
unacceptable as marriage partners, as well as impotent men; and there are questions as to 
whether a husband and wife would be morally allowed to have sex while the woman is 
pregnant (she cant, after all, get more pregnant).  It would seem that, in their haste to 
exclude homosexual marriage, they cast the net too wide and threw out more than they 
intended. 
 Finnis has a reply, of course.  He claims the importance is not whether or not an 
individual heterosexual couple can procreate, it is whether or not they are open to the 
possibility and whether or not their act is of the reproductive kind, that is, they have the 
right genitals to do the deed (if the genitals worked correctly, at any rate).  Homosexual 
unions, by contrast, have nothing to do with their having children by each other so 
                                                
3 See, for example, John Corvinos Homosexuality and the PIB Argument.  Ethics 115 (April 2005), pp. 
501-534 and Why Shouldnt Tommy and Jim Have Sex? Same Sex, pp. 3-16; Andrew Koppelman, 
Homosexual Conduct, Same Sex, pp. 44-57;  and Jonathan Rauch, Who Needs Marriage? Same Sex, 
pp. 304-316. 
4 Finnis, of course, thinks homosexuals shouldnt have sexual relationships at all.  But I will keep referring 
to gay marriage, as it is the biggest point of contact of private relationships with social control. 
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their sexual acts together cannot do what they may hope and imagine.  Unlike 
heterosexual sex, even where the partners are sterile, homosexual sex acts can do no 
more than provide each partner with an individual gratification.5  First of all, I doubt that 
two gay men having sex hope and imagine their union will result in children.  But I can 
believe that they hope and imagine that it will achieve something else, something 
different than mere individual gratification- among other things, greater intimacy and a 
deeper bond with their partner.  This point will be addressed shortly, when talking about 
false dichotomy. 
 Back to the argument around reproduction:  I think, with the reasoning described 
above, Finnis can claim to extend his marital good to sterile couples who dont know that 
theyre sterile.  But for couples who are aware of their inability to procreate, unless they 
are actively praying for a miracle, I cannot imagine that they hope and imagine their 
union will result in children.  Those acts dont seem to be of the reproductive kind any 
more than two lesbians or two gay men, or a heterosexual couple using contraceptives.  
True, homosexuals dont have the right equipment for procreation (although, they could 
adopt or, for lesbians, use artificial insemination), and heterosexuals using contraceptives 
actively work against it.  But the outcome and mindset would seem to be no different 
than heterosexual couples who know they are incapable of having children: they know 
they wont have children, dont expect children, and still have sex anyway.  On the other 
hand, it is not entirely clear why the ability to procreate is something to be morally 
concerned about.  If the morally relevant component is the mutual responsibility and 
support the spouses would have to exhibit to best raise the children they had, then it 
might be possible to realize that in other ways as well (such as the caregiving I mentioned 
                                                
5 Finnis, p. 34.  Emphasis in original. 
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earlier).  It would seem that, absent a different explanation, if we allow knowingly-sterile 
heterosexuals to marry, we still dont have a good reason to disallow homosexuals from 
marrying. 
 Moving on to the false dilemma objection:  Finnis claims that either a sex act is 
marital, or its immoral.  He thinks that the only way to coherently call many sex acts 
immoral is to call all non-marital acts immoral.  He thinks that non-marital sex acts can 
do no more than provide each partner with an individual gratification,6 and that without 
embracing the marital good there can be no coherent argument against adultery, 
promiscuity, bestiality, and so on.7 
 John Corvino thinks, and I have a tendency to agree, that this seems to result from 
a bad phenomenology of sexual desire.8  It just seems incorrect that someone must 
realize the twin goods of friendship and procreation to avoid acting from motivations of 
mere gratification.  It seems empirically verifiable that there are people who engage in 
deep, loving relationships, whose sex acts are not just about personal pleasure, but also 
bonding and sharing something deep and meaningful with a particular other individual.  
If Finnis is correct in his dichotomy, he must make a case why there are so many people 
who dont realize the marital good, or even aim for it (homosexuals, heterosexuals using 
contraception) who bother to try finding a stable partner, rather than who- or whatever 
happens to be willing and walking by.9 
 In the absence of that response it would seem we have to conclude that sexual 
relationships can achieve bonds of friendship, companionship, and support deeper and 
                                                
6 Finnis, p. 35. 
7 This is actually a form of the PIB defense, which I examine later.  I will treat the matter briefly in this 
section, however. 
8 Corvino, John. Homosexuality and the PIB Argument.  Ethics 115 (April 2005), p. 521. 
9 Corvino, Homosexuality and the PIB Argument, p. 521. 
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more fulfilling than any platonic friendship, even if the individuals involved are not 
actively looking to have children.  I suppose this could be wrong, but it does not seem 
terribly likely that so many people (the majority of the sexually active public) would be 
having illusory experiences or, in other terms, afflicted with a sexual false consciousness. 
 Similarly, the claim that homosexuals do not have a case against adultery is 
unsound.  Marriage is a commitment of mutual trust and support, and generally that 
promise is between two people and also includes an agreement to sexual exclusivity.  
Engaging in adultery breaks that trust and harms the well-being of the non-adulterer; 
thats why its immoral.10  Other sexual immoralities can be treated as well; for 
example, arguments against polygamy, incest, and bestiality will be treated below, in 
section VI. 
 So it seems there is a false dichotomy in Finnis marital good.  Theres no reason 
to suspect that sexual morality is an either marital or immoral thing.  There are a wide 
range of sexual options (including homosexuality, for some people) that seem compatible 
with the full human flourishing of the individuals involved, options that do not involve 
mere egoistic hedonism.  It is because of these additional options that nontraditionalists 
have access to arguments against practices such as adultery.  And if there are a wide 
range of morally-acceptable sexual options available to most human beings (including, it 
would seem, homosexuality), then it would seem that government (and society) have 
little reason to legislate against them.  But there is another thing I want to mention here. 
 Personally, I think it is unreasonable to insist, in an age when individuals can 
choose whether or not to have children, that they must be willing to answer that question 
in the affirmative or forego sex to be moral human beings.  I see nothing wrong with a 
                                                
10 I talk about the more difficult case of open marriages, or polyamory more generally, in section VI. 
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middle-aged man, married with children, getting a vasectomy because he and his wife do 
not have the time, money, or energy to raise new children properly.  I dont think that 
someone who chooses not to have children because he (or she) thinks he (or she) might 
be a bad parent should be required to live life as a monk to avoid being sexually immoral.  
And I think it is implausible to claim that merely being willing to masturbate once 
damages any children one might have in the future.  Of course, it could be argued that 
Finnis does not need to say masturbation harms children, he could just say that 
masturbation is wrong because it cannot produce children.  But then we are left with the 
sterile partners objection presented earlier, which seems to be a strong strike against his 
position. 
 Certainly, forcing a child to watch an adult masturbate would be harmful.  But 
this is not (or not just) what he is talking about: sexual immorality (which includes 
masturbation and contracepted heterosexual sex) runs contrary tothe good of 
procreation and of the children whose education etc. so depends on the context of a good 
marriage Indeed, all sexual immoralityis contrary to love-of-neighbor, i.e., of 
children.11   
 This conclusion is, in a sense, heartening:  it relieves critics of the need to 
construct a reductio argument against it.  By excluding masturbation and contraception 
(is natural family planning acceptable?)  from the range of acts that might ever be 
considered morally acceptable, Finnis has successfully ensured that the overwhelming 
majority of human beings will never be able to realize his good in any non-illusory way.  
Rather than raise up sex as something beautiful and wonderful that should be valued, 
views like Finnis have had a tendency to arise from social contexts where sex is seen as 
                                                
11 Finnis, p. 39.  Emphasis in original. 
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a fundamentally dirty, sinful thing, and any kind of expression of human sexuality is 
immoral.12  That is something that I do not think most Americans would want to return 
to, regardless of how disdainfully they might look on the current state of sexual 
immorality in this country.  In any case, it does not seem to be a sound basis for 
formulating public policy. 
 This brings me to the third and final objection to Finnis work.  In his paper Law, 
Morality, and Sexual Orientation, he begins by drawing a sharp line between the 
public and private realms: Supervision of truly private adult consensual conduct is now 
(and rightly) considered to be outside the states normally proper role. But supervision 
of the moral-cultural-educational environment is maintained as a very important part of 
the states justification for claiming legitimately the loyalty of its decent citizens.13  He 
goes on to note that from societys point of view, it isnt private homosexual acts that 
matter, but rather public activities intended specifically to promote, procure and 
facilitate homosexual conduct.14 So it is socially permissible to be gay, as long as the 
public doesnt actually know about it.  The problem, socially, is when you start letting 
other people know youre gay, to try and find someone to have those private and 
permissible (though still immoral) sex acts.  Finnis seems to have in mind here something 
more substantial than merely going to a bar to pick someone up, but rather things like 
national organizations of homosexuals designed to spread awareness and tolerance.  To 
allow those would work significant discrimination and injustice against (and would 
                                                
12 Im thinking of fundamentalist or puritanical Christanity and fundamentalist Islam as two good 
examples. 
13 Finnis, p. 32.  As an aside, one wonders whether non-decent citizens legitimately owe loyalty to the state.  
Of course, as an anarchist, I doubt anyone does, but that is neither here nor there. 
14 Finnis, p. 32.  Emphasis in original. 
 14
indeed damage) families, associations and institutions15 dedicated to the true marital 
good. 
 This is to say that gay marriage (in fact, any and all public homosexual activity) 
can and should be prohibited by government because it harms families.  Its not 
immediately clear how he thinks it accomplishes that, though.  Certainly, there is a 
chance that public acceptance of homosexual relationships- essentially redefining the 
marital good to merely involve the sole good of friendship- would encourage other, 
innocent heterosexuals to revise their understanding of the marital good as well.  The idea 
that sexual mores might widen across society is a not unreasonable claim.  The problem 
is that there is good reason to suspect that not all non-marital sex acts are actually 
harmful to either the individual or the public.  
 But Finnis claim is stronger:  Any willingness toengage in non-marital sex 
radically undermines my marriage itself.16  This could be meant in two ways (the text is 
unclear): either it is a willingness on his part to engage in non-marital sex, which would 
undermine his marriage.  But it is possible that not everyone who is willing to perform 
non-marital acts has their marriage undermined.  Or it could mean that someone elses 
willingness undermines Finnis marriage by cheapening the value and intelligibility of 
marriage as an institution, which seems unlikely at best.  Either way, the conclusions do 
not show what he intends.  Society might not regard the marital good as highly as it 
should, but the marital good is not about societys input.  Its not the three-in-one flesh.  
It is about the commitment and friendship of two people, between them.  Does the 
support of society help them fulfill that bond?  Yes, it does.  But widening the idea of 
                                                
15 Finnis, p. 33. 
16 Finnis, p. 39. 
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what is sexually acceptable does not entail hostility to views that retain a narrow view.  In 
the world of homosexual marriage, Finnis good human beings can still attain the marital 
good.  Theyre just not the only ones who can call themselves married.   
 I simply fail to see how two men filing joint tax returns have any effect on Finnis 
marriage.  And I certainly dont see how it would have a greater effect than those same 
two men living in the same relationship (privately), but without the legal title of 
marriage and the basket of rights that comes with it.  It is true that legal recognition 
matters for the couple involved in the marriage; lack of legal recognition can stress long-
term relationships and lead to their dissolution.  But Finnis draws a clear distinction 
between private homosexual relationships, which he thinks should not be criminalized by 
the state, and homosexual marriage, which he believes should not be recognized.  I would 
think that more harm to the marital good would be done by the permissibility of 
homosexual relationships in general, not by the ability to obtain certain legal rights and 
responsibilities.  If anything, it is more prudent to encourage homosexual marriage:  not 
allowing it in any form, while permitting homosexual sex, could be said to send the 
message to society that fleeting sexual encounters are better than long-term committed 
relationships.   
 Perhaps I am misinterpreting Finnis argument; the bulk of his paper is actually 
about why homosexual activity is immoral for the individuals involved, not harmful to 
actual, existing marriages and the state.  The fact is, though, that knowledge of some 
homosexual activity, no matter how closeted the individuals involved might be, will 
always trickle out to the public.  The private lives of homosexuals (or heterosexuals, for 
that matter) cannot be completely locked away from public sight.  I think Finnis 
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argument would be more consistent if he argued for what he seems to think, although 
doesnt state:  private homosexual activity should be the concern of government also.  
But if he goes that far, he would have to admit government regulation into private 
heterosexual relationships as well- making sure people arent swingers, using condoms, 
or masturbating.  Without that, his argument seems to call for a kind of schizophrenic 
public policy.  
 Ive looked at what I think are three main objections to the idea of the marital 
good.  I think that the argument fails on its own grounds, but perhaps more importantly, 
involves assumptions about human life and sexuality that most people outside of some 
very specific, limited comprehensive doctrines are not willing to accept.17  Time now to 
move on to the moral tradition defense. 
 
IV. The Moral Tradition Defense 
 
 The moral tradition defense is less elaborate, but still easily addressed.  There are 
two forms that it can take: the first says that there are moral traditions in this country, that 
those traditions exist for a reason, and that it can be socially disastrous to tinker with 
those traditions without an overwhelmingly good reason.  When voiced in the public 
sphere, it is almost always accompanied by some form of the PIB 
(pedophilia/incest/bestiality, or slippery slope, defense) defense.  The second form is 
more legalistic and says that, constitutionally, the desire to maintain traditions just 
because they are traditions is a valid secular purpose.  But with regards to the second 
                                                
17 Im thinking extremely conservative Christians here, but it is by no means limited to them (many 
Muslims and some Jews would also fit, for example). 
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form, it does not seem that specifically religious traditions could be legitimately enforced 
by the government upon the public at large.  We must determine if the tradition in 
question is problematically religious, and to do this we have to look at the reasons 
justifying the tradition and possibly even the likely effects of changing it (a process that 
is largely identical to the elaboration and treatment of the first form described above).  
Elements of both forms of the argument can be seen in Scalias dissent in Lawrence v. 
Texas:   
 
Countless judicial decisions and legislative enactments have relied on the ancient 
proposition that a governing majoritys belief that certain sexual behavior is 
immoral and unacceptable constitutes a rational basis for regulation.State 
laws against bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution, masturbation, 
adultery, fornication, bestiality, and obscenity are likewise sustainable only in 
light of [Bowers v. Hardwicks] validation of laws based on moral choices.  Every 
single one of these laws is called into question today.What a massive disruption 
of the current social order, therefore, the overruling of Bowers entails.18 
 
I am not personally aware of any laws in any state that prohibit masturbating in private, 
but Scalias point is clear enough: as in the first form of the argument described above, 
when you tamper with tradition, society (the current social order) gets hurt.  I think the 
argument is separable into two distinct parts: first, that tradition is something that we can 
and should respect.  Second, not respecting it in a certain limited way (allowing 
homosexual marriage) will lead to disastrous consequences (total sexual anarchy).  The 
                                                
18 Scalias dissent, Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
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second part I treat in section VI, the PIB Defense, below.  What I am concerned with in 
this section is the claim that tradition, specifically, the tradition in the United States that 
homosexuality is a bad thing, should be respected. 
 It is tempting to brush the argument off as a fallacious appeal to tradition.  If 
traditions are worthwhile, we should be able to point to some external reason justifying 
them.  The moral tradition defense doesnt attempt to justify its judgments of sexual 
immorality, it just says that they are immoral because tradition says so.  To say, as the 
PIB defense does, that the moral tradition is justified because it prevents the sexual 
anarchy that would reign in its absence, is question-begging; sexual anarchy has to be 
justified as immoral on other external grounds as well, even if all sides in the debate 
agree that adult incest, bestiality, and adultery (at least) are morally problematic.  The 
real question is why such acts should be considered immoral, something that is not 
addressed by merely assuming that they are. 
 The moral tradition defense is not as easily dismissed as one might think at first 
glance, however.  As Jonathan Rauch notes, there is a kind of Burkean line of reasoning 
one can credit to it: 
 
[H]uman societies evolve rich and complicated webs of nonlegal rules in the 
forms of customs, traditions and institutions.  Like prices, the customs generated 
by societies may often seem irrational or arbitrary.  But the very fact that they are 
the customs that have evolved implies that there is a kind of practical logic 
embedded in them that may not be apparent from even a sophisticated analysis.19 
 
                                                
19 Rauch, Jonathan.  Who Needs Marriage? in Same Sex, p. 306. 
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The argument is excellent for traditionalists because it seems to remove the necessity of 
justifying traditions.  No matter how rigorous a critical analysis one might put traditions 
through, you might not find the practical reasons it rests on.  So in fact, traditional moral 
prohibitions dont need to justify themselves on external grounds.  For traditionalists, the 
fact that the traditional prohibitions exist is justification (this is the essence of the second 
form of the moral tradition defense). 
 Although the point increases the strength of the moral tradition defense, it isnt by 
much.  The question that ultimately must be addressed is that is whether or not supporting 
tradition because it is tradition is a valid secular purpose, and whether or not the tradition 
against homosexuality is a secular tradition.  Extreme forms of the argument from 
tradition make tampering with the moral framework of society undesirable in any case for 
fear of the social disruption that might result.  And as Rauch points out, slavery was 
widely accepted as moral in the United States for hundreds of years before the end of the 
Civil War.20  It is extremely difficult to say that ending slavery in that case would have 
been the morally (or legally) incorrect thing to do.  But in admitting that, you must also 
admit that contemporary social decisions must be made with respect to some kind of 
externally existing moral framework, and thus, traditions must be justified by more than 
the mere fact that they are a tradition.  In that way, supporting traditions through 
government action can only be seen to be a valid secular purpose if the tradition is 
justifiable on external secular grounds. 
 In the more mild form, this argument merely says that you need strong reasons 
before attempting to monkey with moral traditions.  But that is not a problem for the 
supporter of gay marriage: if there is any social policy today that has a fair claim to 
                                                
20 Rauch, p. 307. 
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being scaldingly inhumane, it is the ban on gay marriage.21  While traditionalists would 
vehemently object to that statement, it is only on the grounds of social traditions that 
havent yet been shown to be externally justified, weighed against the activists claims of 
equal protection, justice, nondiscrimination, and liberty.   
 It is true that the last claim needs to be substantiated more fully, something that is 
beyond the scope of this paper.  But it does seem to have an air of prima facie plausibility 
to it.  Regarding the second form of the argument mentioned earlier- that supporting 
tradition is a constitutionally valid secular concern of the government- it seems that it 
does not work absent some kind of external secular justification, something that seems to 
be lacking entirely in the case of homosexual relationships.  Enforcing traditions with 
religious justifications, what is left after removing secular arguments as flawed, can 
hardly be a valid secular concern.  In any case, resorting to tradition for its own sake 
simply does not work as a substantial argument against homosexual marriage.   
 
V.  The Defense From Definition 
 
 The defense from definition is probably the most simplistic and most easily 
countered of the four.  The position runs as follows:  marriage is defined as being 
between a man and a woman.  Therefore, homosexuals cant get married.  To argue 
otherwise is ridiculous, because it is simply not linguistically possible.  If you expand the 
definition of marriage, it distorts the meaning of the term so that its not really pointing at 
marriage anymore. 
                                                
21 Rauch, p. 307. 
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 To be fair, I think that this argument has some merit in judicial considerations.  If 
a term is defined in a certain way, thats what the law is.  If the role of a judge is to 
interpret and not legislate, they are typically bound by these definitions.  Courts have 
used that reasoning before to deny marital status to same sex relationships:  It appears to 
us that appellants are prevented from marrying by their own incapability of entering 
into a marriage as that term is defined.22  This would seem to be a strike against my 
argument; I am, after all, arguing precisely that judges do need to change the term.    But 
something similar happened when the antimiscegenation laws were overturned- marriage 
prior to that could have been defined as between a man and woman of the same race, 
and afterwards the definition had shed the unnecessary of the same race.  The short of 
it is that, with regard to constitutional interpretation, if judges have a compelling reason 
to modify the legal definition of marriage, and no reason to refrain from doing so, the 
mere fact that the definition is a certain way should not prevent them from ruling in favor 
of change (at the very least, recognition of domestic partnerships).  
 However weighty the argument may be from the view of judicial interpretation, it 
stacks up rather poorly as an argument to legislators and the public against policy change.  
I will explore this point further and go briefly into the world of policy to show more 
precisely why it is not a good secular reason under the Lemon test.  Take the word 
pregnancy for a moment.  The definition of that word cannot be widened to include men 
and still retain a semblance of its original meaning, because men are physically incapable 
of being pregnant, period.  I think this example points at what traditionalists mean by 
using this argument, but it doesnt really work- mainly because it is not physically 
                                                
22 Jones v. Hallahan, ruling of the Court of Appeals of Kentucky, Nov. 1973.  Excerpt found in: Andrew 
Sullivan, ed. Same-Sex Marriage: Pro and Con (Vintage Books: New York, 1997), p.95. 
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impossible for homosexual relationships to realize the goods of heterosexual marriage, 
the important qualities that make marriage marriage.  The marital good aside, important 
aspects of a marriage such as companionship, loving support and care, and even child 
rearing (through adoption or the artificial insemination of lesbians) can all be achieved.  
So widening the legal definition of the word marriage would not seem to destroy the 
word, but rather, loosen it from unnecessary restrictions (between a man and a woman) 
that dont have any apparent empirical bearing on the essence of marriage as a social and 
interpersonal institution. 
 Even if loosening the definition of marriage to include homosexual unions did 
destroy the meaning of the term, I fail to see why that is a bad thing.  Legal definitions 
are not biological imperatives; if changing the legal definition of a term (by a legislator 
or, in some cases, a judge) would yield substantial benefits for negligible cost, I see no 
reason to refrain from doing so.  That is, absent evidence that doing so would be harmful 
to people in some real way (and we dont appear to have gotten that evidence from the 
previous sections, nor will we from the PIB argument described in the next), there isnt a 
compelling reason to refrain from slightly modifying the definition of marriage to include 
homosexual unions. 
 Permit me a brief aside to mention that if this definitional stance is the last 
argument of traditionalists, marriage activists might be tempted to concede and accept 
domestic partnership laws that provide the same basket of rights as traditional marriage.  
But this compromise is a halfway house that only serves to make everyone equally 
unhappy.  For homosexuals, it is a separate but equal state that, however benignly, gives 
them a constant reminder that the society does not really respect or accept them.  
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Paradoxically, opponents would see the exact opposite- it is granting too much equality to 
a practice that, from their point of view, is intrinsically immoral and not worthy of public 
encouragement in any form.  Add to that the fact that domestic partnerships would 
probably be seen as (and in fact actually be) a stepping stone to the title of full marriage, 
and it seems the only reason to adopt domestic partnerships at all is unnecessary 
linguistic stubbornness on the part of opponents.   
 There are arguments revolving around domestic partnerships vs. full marriage 
titles, but going into them more fully is beyond the scope of this thesis.  The point of this 
section, to show the weakness in the definitional argument both in the judicial and public 
arenas, I think has been sufficiently shown and it is time to move on. 
 
VI. The PIB Defense23 
 
 If we allow homosexual marriage, it follows that we must allow polygamy, incest, 
and bestiality (PIB) to run rampant through our streets.  That is what opponents of gay 
marriage want us to think, anyway.  Some traditionalists go farther and say that allowing 
gay marriage, by changing the family as the basic unit of society, society itself will 
come to a chaotic, debauchery-filled halt.  But this is just a step down the slope; usually, 
the collapse is because we cant prevent things like polygamy, incest, and bestiality 
anymore.  The response to the more limited PIB argument is substantially identical to the 
wider, so I will only be talking about the former here.  Despite my treating this argument 
last, I would venture to say that it is the most common of the four.  It is rare to find an 
                                                
23 This section of the essay draws heavily from arguments set forth in John Corvinos Homosexuality and 
the PIB Argument. 
 24
argument against gay unions that does not include to this line of thinking in some way.  
After all, even if something is intrinsically bad, it does not hurt to point at negative 
consequences when making your case to the public. 
 This defense is often quickly brushed off as an example of the slippery slope 
fallacy.  It certainly seems as though it might be, especially when you consider that each 
major change in marriage over the years (allowing women to own property, permitting 
interracial marriage, etc.) has been accompanied by virtually the same doomsday 
predictions on the part of opponents.  But as John Corvino notes, slippery slope 
arguments are not necessarily fallacious.24  It is possible that there might be a logical 
connection between homosexuality and PIB.  The supporter of gay marriage should show 
why that is not the case before moving on.  The sheer prevalence of the argument in the 
public sphere suggests that it would be strategically wise to confront it anyway. 
 Corvino notes that nontraditionalists can tackle the problem in the following way:  
First, show that existing arguments against homosexuality not only do not work to prove 
the immorality of homosexual relations, but that they are also insufficient to show the 
immorality of all PIB relations.  Once that is done, give arguments that nontraditionalists 
could use against (at least some) PIB relations.  The understanding is that any new 
arguments traditionalists could give would be usable by nontraditionalists as well.  It is a 
response to Finnis challenge that those who propound a homosexual ideology have no 
principled moral case to offer against (prudent and moderate) promiscuity, indeed the 
getting of orgasmic sexual pleasure in whatever friendly touch or welcoming orifice 
                                                
24 Corvino,  Homosexuality and the PIB Argument, p. 503.  A fuller development of the idea can be 
found in Eugene Volokhs The Mechanisms of the Slippery Slope, Harvard Law Review 116 (2003), pp. 
1077-1114. 
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(human or otherwise) one may opportunely find it.25  Giving examples of possible 
nontraditionalist arguments is just proof that it is not necessary to choose between (for 
example) only uncontracepted vaginal intercourse between a husband and wife and 
complete sexual and legal anarchy. 
 Step one of the process has already been completed in the earlier sections, when 
treating the three previous arguments.  None of them seem to work very well, and are 
certainly not slam dunks against homosexual marriage.  I will now proceed to step two 
and give a few brief suggestions of arguments against PIB relationships might proceed. 
 Take incest, for example.  Corvino takes an interesting position and claims that 
the marital good proponents actually would have to allow at least some incestuous 
relationships under their scheme.   Namely, they would have to permit consensual, sterile, 
adult heterosexual incest (a consistent marital good proponent could argue that it is 
impermissible because sterile partners cant have children- but this just leads back to the 
familiar sterile partners objection, which has results that most would be loathe to 
accept).  Such incestuous acts, according to Corvino, seem prima facie capable of 
achieving the biological complementarity and friendship constitutive of the martial 
good.26  As distasteful as it might be, nothing in the formulation of the marital good 
itself seems to exclude that case (unless proponents were to revise it to exclude all sex 
between sterile partners- but this, again, has other unwanted consequences).  So any 
reason to object to that case must come from somewhere other than the marital good- and 
if it is a reason unconnected to the marital good (and positions like the moral tradition 
                                                
25 Finnis, p. 42. 
26 Corvino, Homosexuality and the PIB Argument, p. 525. 
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defense described earlier), then those who advocate homosexual marriage can probably 
use them as well. 
 That is just one example of how the process might continue.  The point is that 
traditionalists need new reasons to back up their rejection of PIB arguments- and that 
those arguments are ones that would probably be available to gay rights activists, since 
they really cant revolve around something like a marital good or teleology of the body (I 
give brief suggestions of what these arguments might look like further below).   
 On the other hand, conservatives might say that they dont need to resort to these 
philosophical arguments, but merely have to look at the real-world results of the 
increasing liberalization of sexuality:  high rates of teen pregnancy and illegitimate 
children, epidemics of sexually transmitted diseases, unbelievably high divorce rates, and 
so on prove that we are on a slippery slope (they might say).  But these claims do not 
necessarily speak against gay marriage.  Take divorce: nothing about being aghast at the 
huge number of divorces in this country would seem to require one to be equally aghast 
at the prospect of gay marriages.  Insofar as high divorce rates are a bad thing, it seems 
more appropriate to make divorces harder to get or educate people more effectively so 
that they have the knowledge of what theyre getting into and have the responsibility and 
maturity to deal with any problems that might arise.27 
 Sexually transmitted disease is a problem, at least in the case of incurable, 
potentially life-threatening diseases.  But again, being against STDs would not seem to 
require one to be against gay marriage as well.  It is not incoherent to promote 
responsible sexual behaviors (such as abstinence or serial monogamy combined with 
always using protection and getting tested for STDs regularly) and accept homosexual 
                                                
27 Jonathan Rauch suggests something along these lines, for example.  Rauch, pp. 315-16. 
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marriage.  It would be a change in the current social fabric, but one does not have to 
accept everything to accept responsible homosexual relationships. 
 Teen pregnancy and promiscuity can be treated in a similar light.  The problem 
does not seem to be the widening of what sexual behaviors are morally permissible, but 
rather the decrease in emphasis on personal responsibility for ones actions, both in 
deciding what to do and in dealing with the consequences.  While traditional sexual 
ethics might remedy this to some degree, it does not need to maintain a fierce opposition 
to homosexual acts to do so. 
 I have to say that in the end, however, I think there is some truth in the PIB 
defense.  Traditionalists are right in that if they cant use their traditional justifications to 
exclude polygamy, incest, and bestiality, then a widening of what is considered sexually 
permissible (and legally acceptable) will almost certainly happen.  I can see the 
possibility of marital benefits being extended to polyamorous relationships, with the 
Gordian knot of property relations that would ensue.  I dont think its terribly likely, 
given how they have a history of being bad for women (or, the weaker party in the case 
of homosexual polyamorous relationships).  And I highly doubt that even if it were to 
become legal, it would become anything near widespread.  Free love was tried before, 
and it doesnt seem to work well for most people.  But that does not mean the door will 
simply open wide to legal recognition of every possible relationship under the sun.  
Human-animal civil unions, for instance, seem fairly unlikely.  I cant see anyone being 
able to marry one of their farm animals, since the basic ability to consent to the union 
would seem to be missing entirely.  Incest, even the hard case of nonfertile consensual 
adult incest, will almost certainly remain a cultural taboo and entirely illegal, if for no 
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other reason than to make it less likely that adults will be tempted to abuse their young 
relations.  This is a brief listing of how the PIB slope might be halted by gay rights 
advocates, albeit a bit further down the slope than many might prefer.  Since a detailed 
rejection of polygamy, incest, and bestiality is really beyond the scope of this thesis, I see 
no need to elaborate the arguments any farther. 
 The admission that there might be a kernel of truth in the PIB argument, however, 
should not be seen as a weakness in my argument.  We should only be upset at the 
widening of social mores and legal recognition of sexual relations if there is something 
wrong or dangerous about them to begin with, something that the traditionalists havent 
fully proven.  Even if they were to do so, it probably would not be on the basis of reasons 
that also exclude all homosexual relationships.  Insofar as it does not work as an 
argument against homosexuality, the PIB defense, the last and most common of the four 
standard arguments against gay marriage, fails. 
 
VII. The Unconstitutionality Revealed 
 
 So, thus far it seems as though the standard arguments against homosexual 
marriage do not hold up (or, at the very least, have serious issues that must be addressed).  
As well-developed as they might be, they ultimately collapse under rigorous scrutiny.  
This alone is excellent for the gay rights activist.  But for my purposes, to show that an 
unconstitutional endorsement of religion is occurring, I have to go farther.  It is not 
enough for me to show that the arguments are uniformly poor in character; I have to show 
that they, in actuality, also have a distinct and unavoidably religious element to them. 
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 I have shown how the major arguments against gay marriage can be successfully 
rebutted.  Thus, it is not philosophically justifiable to oppose gay marriage because of 
them; anyone who does so is drawing unsupported conclusions from flawed arguments.  
But this is not to say that opposition to gay marriage is always based upon a variation of 
one or more of the arguments listed previously.  In fact, in the absence of those four 
reasons, it is still possible to field a logically consistent opposition to the policy in one of 
three ways: on religious grounds (Homosexuality and gay marriage are wrong because 
[God/Allah/Confucius/etc.] tells us it is wrong), on personal distaste (I oppose gay 
marriage because the very idea makes me sick), or on nothing at all (that is, a priori 
assumptions such as Homosexuality and gay marriage are simply wrong, period).28  
The latter two are not distinctly religious in tone, although I suspect any who would give 
voice to them would have unspoken religious convictions lurking somewhere in the 
background. 
 This rejection of most secular arguments would seem to be enough to field a 
strong equal protection argument for allowing gay marriage.29  This argument has been 
made well and often in the scholarly literature and in actual court cases, and it is beyond 
                                                
28 Of course, there is no requirement in America that voters form their opinions and vote only on the basis 
of the soundest philosophical arguments available.  It is perfectly legal to vote on policies for completely 
illogical, inconsistent reasons.  But this would seem to present no substantial difference to the 
traditionalists founding their beliefs on personal distaste or nothing at all- opponents of gay marriage, if 
forced to admit that their arguments were flawed, would probably say that homosexuality is just wrong 
rather than modify their beliefs to fit the best arguments.  Regardless, whether traditionalists make a priori 
determinations, base conclusions on flawed premises, or just feel ill at the thought of same-sex 
relationships, it does not seem to give their side much ammunition when deciding which of the two 
positions has greater constitutional merit.   
 Moreover, it is possible that there exists, somewhere out there in the ether, some phenomenal 
argument that proves, beyond a shadow of a doubt, that homosexuality is wrong.  But if no one has yet 
given voice to it, it seems unlikely that anyone is actually using it in their reasoning; I see no need to treat 
the possibility any further. 
29 Similar, though by no means identical, arguments were made in Baehr v. Lewin (1993 Hawaii), Baker v. 
Vermont (1999 Vermont), and Goodridge v. Department of Public Health (2004 Massachusetts), which all 
decided in favor of homosexuals.  
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the scope of this thesis to go into it here.  The basic point is that, absent compelling 
reasons to the contrary, not allowing homosexuals to marry is a violation of the equal 
protection clause.  Since there dont seem to be any compelling  secular reasons, 
prohibiting gay marriage would be unconstitutional.  But that does not get us much closer 
to the different claim that it is also an unconstitutional endorsement of religion. 
 I admitted in my introduction that I do not think that I can show that prohibiting 
gay marriage is necessarily an unconstitutional endorsement of religion.  Now, I can 
explain why that is the case: although most of the substantial arguments against gay 
marriage do not work, there still exist non-religious bases that traditionalists can turn to.  
It is entirely possible that traditionalists, in the unlikely scenario where they are forced to 
admit the weaknesses in their arguments, would turn to precisely those reasons to 
continue their crusade.  There is no necessary connection to religion here.  There cant be 
a violation of the establishment clause if no religion is being established, after all. 
 But to say that I cannot make a case for necessary connection to religion is not to 
say that no case can be made to suggest that that is what is in all probability actually 
happening.  That is not the end of the story, for once that is accomplished I still need to 
show that the connection to religion is of an unconstitutional nature.  With that in mind, 
the rest of this section will proceed in two parts:  first, describing the evidence suggesting 
religious tones to the traditionalist position, and second, explaining how this connection 
can be seen as constitutionally problematic. 
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The Connection to Religion 
 
 The assertion of a religious connection is a point both easy to believe and difficult 
to prove.  The question of whether religious justifications actually lie behind most 
traditionalists opposition to gay marriage is, of course, primarily an empirical one.  
Delving into the evidence fully and completely is beyond the scope of what I can 
accomplish here.  Nevertheless, I think I can offer a brief list of evidence that supports 
my position; that, combined with what I believe to be common perception of the public 
debate, should be enough to grant it a high degree of plausibility.   
 There is no need to go outside of the scholarly literature to find a religious 
connection.  John Finnis, in an endnote regarding his point that persons choosing to 
engage in non-marital acts dis-integrates each of them precisely as acting persons, 
helpfully informs us that the full argument is developed in Germain Grisezs The Way of 
the Lord Jesus, vol. 2, Living a Christian Life.30  I suppose it is possible that a fully 
secular argument could be successfully extracted from that, but I have my doubts.  Other 
authors are not shy in invoking Scripture in their arguments, although to their credit they 
are usually trying to prove a theological point. 
 Although politicians have become more careful about invoking specifically 
religious reasoning in past years, religion is certainly not absent from the floor of 
Congress any more than it is from the academy.  Speaking in the October 9, 1996 Senate 
debate on the Defense of Marriage Act, Senator Byrd had these pearls of wisdom to 
distribute: Indeed, thousands of years of Judeo-Christian teachings leave absolutely no 
                                                
30 Finnis, John.  Law, Morality, and Sexual Orientation.  In Same Sex: Debating the Ethics, Science, 
and Culture of Homosexuality, John Corvino, ed.  Pp. 31-43.  The quote appears on page 35; the endnote is 
7. 
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doubt as to the sanctity, purpose, and reason for the union of man and woman.  One has 
only to turn to the Old Testament and read the word of God to understand how eternal is 
the true definition of marriage.  Woe betide that society, Mr. President, that fails to 
honor that heritage and begins to blur that tradition which was laid down by the Creator 
in the beginning.31 
 Religious appeals need not be fire and brimstone, however, as seen in President 
Bushs 2004 State of the Union Address: Our nation must defend the sanctity of 
marriage.  The outcome of the debate is important- and so is the way in which we 
conduct it.  The same moral tradition that defines marriage teaches that each individual 
has dignity and value in Gods sight.32 
 Outside of elected officials we have groups such as Focus on the Family and the 
Family Research Council, whose members are seen frequently in the public debate 
speaking in defense of traditional marriage and are not shy about their religious 
convictions.  Focus on the Family, for instance, believes that the institution of marriage 
was intended by God to be a permanent, lifelong relationship between a man and a 
woman,33 and its head, Dr. James Dobson, has enough political clout that, shortly before 
President Bush announced his nomination of Harriet Miers to the Supreme Court, he 
received a private call from Karl Rove assuring him of her judicial philosophy.34  Dr. 
Dobson also hosts a nationally syndicated radio show that airs on over 3,000 stations, 
reaching an estimated 26 million Americans per week.35  The Family Research Council, 
                                                
31 Senator Robert Byrd, Oct. 9, 1996, speaking in the Senate debate on the Defense of Marriage Act.  Found 
in:  Sullivan, Same-Sex Marriage: Pro and Con, pp. 234-5. 
32 President George W. Bush, Jan. 20, 2004 State of the Union Address.  Transcript at: 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2004/01/20040120-7.html 
33 http://www.family.org/welcome/aboutfof/a0000078.cfm 
34 http://www.cnn.com/2005/POLITICS/10/12/miers.religion/index.html 
35 Ibid.  
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part of a coalition of conservative groups that delivered on July 9, 2004 well over a 
million signatures on a petition in support of the Federal Marriage Amendment, lists 
among its core principles the belief that God exists and is sovereign over all creation.36 
 These two groups, although not conclusive evidence on their own, are just 
examples of the trend of evangelical, conservative Christianity that has been growing and 
becoming increasingly politically active over the past few decades.  It is undeniable that 
this movement has millions of Americans behind it; it is equally undeniable that the vast 
majority of these Americans oppose gay marriage, and do so for religious reasons.  The 
question of importance is whether these people constitute a large enough group to give 
plausibility to my position.37 
 Lets look at a few back-of-the-matchbook calculations.  Roughly 80% of 
Americans self-identify as Christians.38  About 70% of them (56% of the population) can 
be safely categorized as evangelical39- a group that is always deeply committed to their 
religious beliefs, unafraid to admit it, and typically very socially conservative.  The 
                                                
36 http://www.frc.org/get.cfm?c=ABOUT_FRC 
37 Certainly, one does not need to be Christian to have religious grounds for opposition to homosexual 
unions.  But other religious groups are, by comparison, so small a percentage of the overall population as to 
make no difference to my argument.  
38 Mayer, Egon, Barry A. Kosmin, and Ariela Keysar.  American Religious Identification Survey, 
performed by the Graduate Center at CUNY (the US Census has not gathered information on religious 
trends since 1936).  Full contents available at: 
http://www.gc.cuny.edu/faculty/research_briefs/aris/aris_index.htm 
39 Noll, Mark A.  American Evangelical Christianity: An Introduction (Blackwell Publishers: Malden, 
Mass., 2001), pp. 30-33.  The percentage is drawn from a 1996 survey; responders could be safely 
categorized as evangelical if they agreed with at least three of the following four statements (p. 31 in the 
text): 
 1.  Strongly agreed that through the life, death and resurrection of Jesus, God provided a way for  
      the forgiveness of my sins. 
 2.  Strongly agreed that the Bible is the inspired word of God, or agreed to whatever degree that  
      the Bible is Gods word, and is to be taken literally, word for word. 
 3.  Strongly agreed that I have committed my life to Christ and consider myself to be a converted  
      Christian. 
 4.  Agreed or strongly agreed that it is important to encourage non-Christians to become  
      Christians. 
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lesson we can take is that there is a significantly large number of people who admit to 
being against homosexual marriage at least in part due to religious convictions. 
 I think it is clear that religious conviction plays a large part in the opposition to 
gay marriage.  The question that has to be addressed now is whether or not that fact is 
constitutionally problematic.  To answer that, I think it is best to go to the Lemon Test. 
 
The Lemon Test 
 
 It is possible that the sheer number of evangelicals would make prohibiting 
homosexual marriage unconstitutional regardless of the status of the secular arguments in 
the debate.  Even if all the arguments against gay marriage I covered earlier did work, it 
would remain the fact that most opponents to gay marriage base their reasoning at least in 
part on religious grounds.  Those religious grounds could be enough to violate the 
establishment clause, as it seems that what the government would be doing is not 
promoting secular interests, but specific religious ones (broadly, this could be taken to be 
religions opposed to gay marriage; more narrowly, it would mean conservative 
Christian movements).  I think that this argument as it stands is fairly weak, however.  It 
has two main strikes against it: first, the secular arguments, if correct, might give the 
government a compelling interest overriding the seemingly minor establishment of 
religion that would be occurring with a ban on gay marriage (the government is not 
prohibiting religions from accepting gay marriage theologically, for instance; merely 
prohibiting gay marriage would not seem to place an undue burden on those religions).  
Secondly, it can be very difficult to prove that the religious reasons are the primary ones.  
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If there are good secular arguments against gay marriage then traditionalists can, in a 
Rawlsian public reason fashion, point to secular reasons and say that although they do 
hold private religious convictions against gay marriage, those reasons do not enter into 
their public decision-making process.  Their decision to have government prohibit gay 
marriage would be made on the basis of secular reasons, not religious ones.  That way, 
even if most opponents do hold private religious convictions opposed to gay marriage, it 
would not seem to be a violation of the establishment clause because no one is using 
those reasons in their public decision-making. 
 The key to both of those points are the secular reasons I spent so much time 
arguing against.  With them out of the way, it becomes much more plausible to say that 
an unconstitutional endorsement of religion is occurring.  Conveniently, it also makes the 
situation fit nicely into the Lemon Test.  The Lemon Test is a three-pronged examination 
to determine whether legislation is constitutionally sound with regards to the 
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.  It was first fully formulated in the 1971 
decision of the Supreme Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman40 and consists of three distinct 
requirements (or prongs): 
 
1. The governments action must have a legitimate secular purpose. 
2. The governments action must not have the primary effect of either advancing or 
inhibiting religion. 
3. The governments action must not result in an excessive entanglement of the 
government and religion. 
 
                                                
40 403 U.S. 602.   
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Legislation must pass all three prongs to be considered constitutional.  Failing one fails 
the test.  It is true that Lemons status as valid law is a little uncertain at this point 
because of inconsistent application of the test to Establishment Clause cases since the 
1980s and Scalia and Thomas sustained criticisms.  But it remains about as accepted 
standard for evaluating these types of cases as we are likely to get, and I see no reason 
not to resort to it here to further examine the idea that an unconstitutional endorsement of 
religion is occurring.  
 As for the prongs themselves, number three is clearly unproblematic.  The 
decision to not permit homosexual marriage does not entangle the government with 
religion in any noticeable way.  Slightly more difficult to pass is the second criterion.  
One could argue that the government is advancing those religions opposed to homosexual 
marriage over those who support (or at least have no theological objections to) it.  But 
this really is not tenable, since the government refuses to accept traditionalists stance 
that homosexuality is intrinsically immoral (at least, insofar as it cannot make 
homosexual behavior illegal).  In any case, it could hardly be called a primary effect. 
 For my purposes the critical point in the test is the first prong, and the bulk of this 
essay has been spent trying to show how it fails to be met.  By showing that the main 
secular arguments against homosexual marriage do not work, I was simultaneously 
showing that no legitimate secular purpose exists to support the policy.  You dont need 
to legislate against gay marriage to stop the possibility of legalized PIB relationship; the 
marital good (if it even exists) is not harmed by two men filing joint tax returns; moral 
tradition does not need to be supported simply for its own sake; and so on.  By contrast, 
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allowing homosexual marriage does have valid secular purposes, such as equal protection 
considerations. 
 One objection to this evaluation might be that the religious connection is far too 
broad, that is, it does not reference any one religion specifically.  Opposition to gay 
marriage is something that unites people across the spectrum of religious traditions.  But 
that does not change the fact that the policy favors the conservative Christians that make 
up the majority of the opposition in this country.  In a similar case, the fact that some 
ultra-Orthodox Jews might favor the teaching of intelligent design (as a backdoor to 
creationism, just like the conservative Christians) doesnt mean the federal courts were 
incorrect in ruling teaching the theory to be an unconstitutional endorsement of 
religion.41  
 A second objection might be that if not allowing homosexual marriage violates 
the Establishment Clause, so does permitting it.  After all, it would seem to be the 
government granting greater recognition to some peoples religious beliefs over others 
(some people do, in fact, believe gay unions to be theologically sound).  But this has no 
more merit than a religious white supremacist claiming that antidiscrimination laws 
negatively favor his own religious beliefs- because, like antidiscrimination laws, 
homosexual marriage can claim to serve a legitimate secular purpose such as equal 
protection or protecting fundamental rights.  Furthermore, making homosexual marriage 
legally permissible does not entail forcing everyone to think it is morally acceptable; 
Catholic priests and Baptist ministers could still refuse to perform them, and their 
                                                
41 While it is true that these rulings (ranging from court-mandated removal of stickers criticizing evolution 
on textbooks to declaring a specific schools decision to teach intelligent design unconstitutional) are 
controversial, it is equally true that they form a body of precedent that counts against the possibility of their 
being overturned and for the possibility of their being considered valid law into the foreseeable future; I see 
no problem in using them as an example here. 
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congregation can continue to ostracize any members who might be outed a bit too soon.42  
Allowing gay marriage does not remove freedom from its opponents, but rather grants 
homosexuals the freedom to live in a way and with a person that they find most 
personally fulfilling, with the backing of a basket of property rights that helps their union 
to endure in the face of adversity and makes it easier to secure the goods (friendship, 
loving companionship, mutual support and, yes, even a stable household within which to 
raise any children the spouses might choose to have) that all marriages claim to aim at. 
 
VIII. Conclusion 
 
 In this thesis I have summarized in brief what I take to be the main arguments 
against homosexual marriage and shown them to be, if not outright unsupportable, at 
least philosophically unsound.  I believe I have made a good case for showing that many 
individuals oppose gay marriage at least in part for religious reasons, and I think I have 
also shown how the policy fails the Lemon Test and violates the Establishment Clause. 
 It is true that activists have already accumulated a wide range of constitutional 
arguments in support of their position.  Equal protection and fundamental right 
considerations are highly important, and I think they are key to realizing change.  But the 
religious aspect of the opposition has been relatively unexplored to this point, and I think 
the possibility of an unconstitutional endorsement of religion would only add further 
weight to already impressive legal briefs.  In short, opponents to gay marriage are left 
with two choices: either they are accepting bad secular arguments, and gay marriage 
should be allowed on equal protection grounds, or they are really using religious reasons, 
                                                
42 At least, ostracize them to the extent already allowed by current antidiscrimination laws. 
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in which case prohibiting gay marriage would be an unconstitutional endorsement of 
religion. 
 After the 2004 presidential election, in which Georgia voters overwhelmingly 
supported a defense of marriage amendment to the state constitution, a friend told me 
he was leaving for Canada because it was clear that Americans dont want us [he and his 
partner] here.  After reviewing the arguments, I have found absolutely no valid reason to 
continue to support the often crushing social condemnation that hounds homosexuals in 
most places across the nation.  I believe that allowing gay marriage would go a long way 
to allowing these men and women to live in the way that they think best promotes their 
own well-being and flourishing, without simultaneously harming the self-interests and 
flourishing of others, and I have written this essay with the intent of providing more 
philosophical ammunition to those who are actively fighting for change.  It is my hopes 
that they are successful, and enable more people to live and fully engage in a form of life 
that has been found so essential and uplifting by so many throughout human history. 
 
